As cloud computing becomes prevalent, more and more sensitive data is being centralized into the cloud for sharing, which brings forth new challenges for outsourced data security and privacy. Attribute-based encryption (ABE) is a promising cryptographic primitive, which has been widely applied to design fine-grained access control system recently. However, ABE is criticized for its high scheme overhead as the computational cost grows with the complexity of the access formula. This disadvantage becomes more serious for mobile devices with constrained computing resources.
Introduction
Cloud computing is an emerging computing paradigm in which IT resources and capacities are provided as services over the Internet while hiding platform and implementation detals. Promising as it is, this paradigm also brings forth new challenges for data security and privacy when users outsource sensitive data for sharing on cloud servers, which are likely outside of the same trusted domain of data owners. An approach to mitigate this challenge is the use of encryption. However, since encryption assures that only the entity owning secret key is able to decrypt the ciphertext, it is not sufficient to support the enforcement of fine-grained access control policies.
Another possible solution is utilizing the well-studied access control technique [33] [39] [47] . However, traditional access control systems are mostly designed for in-house services and depend greatly on the system itself to enforce authorization policies. Thus, they cannot be applied in cloud computing because users and cloud servers are no longer in the same trusted domain. For the purpose of helping the data owner impose access control over data stored on untrusted cloud servers, a feasible consideration would be encrypting data through certain cryptographic primitives but disclosing decryption keys only to authorized users. Upon this intuition, another type of solution [21] [28] [5] [16] is based on a per file access control list (ACL) or file group. As the system scales, however, both ACL and file group-based techniques only provide a coarse-grained access control.
Aiming at providing fine-grained access control over encrypted data, a novel public key primitive namely attribute-based encryption (ABE) [42] has been introduced in the cryptographic community. For the first time, ABE enables public key-based one-to-many encryption. In ABE system, users' private keys and ciphertexts are labeled with sets of descriptive attributes and access policies respectively, and a particular key can decrypt a ciphertext only if the associated attributes and policy match.
Though ABE is a promising primitive to design fine-grained access control system in cloud computing, there are several challenges remained in the application of ABE.
• One of the main drawbacks of ABE is that the computational cost in decryption phase grows with the complexity of the access formula. The drawback appears more serious for resourceconstrained users, such as mobile devices and sensors, because the heavy decryption in ABE may not be independently performed by such users. Therefore, one challenge is how to reduce the decryption complexity of ABE such that it can be applied to fine-grained access control for users with resource-constrained devices.
• Beyond decryption, generating user's private key in existing ABE schemes also requires a great quantity of modular exponentiations. Furthermore, the revocation of any single user in existing ABE requires key-update at authority for remaining users who share his/her attributes. All of these heavy tasks centralized at authority side would make it become the efficiency bottleneck in the whole access control system. Therefore, another challenge is how to reduce the key-issuing complexity of ABE such that scalable access control can be supported.
Contribution Overview
Aiming at tackling the challenges described above, we propose a generic construction of attributebased access control system under an interesting architecture, in which two cloud service providers (CSPs): key generation-cloud service provider (KG-CSP) and decryption-cloud service provider (D-CSP) are involved to perform the outsourced heavy tasks for users' key issuing and file access.
With the help of the CSPs, the computational complexity at both user and attribute authority sides is reduced. Furthermore, since only small computation is required at authority side for single user's private key update, the proposed system is able to efficiently support user revocation even if utilizing the straightforward ABE revocation technique (i.e. update private keys for all the other users affected by the one to be revoked).
The challenge issue in the proposed system is how to outsource the heavy computation to the CSPs as much as possible but without private information leakage. Our solution is introducing an underlying primitive namely outsourced ABE (OABE), which allows expensive tasks to be securely outsourced to CSPs to relieve computation overhead at local.
We firstly propose a basic OABE construction with outsourced decryption for access control system. The proposed construction securely reduces 2d pairing operations in its original ABE scheme [42] to nearly 2 with the help of D-CSP, where d is the threshold value predefined. The idea behind our construction is introducing a default attribute for each user and generating private key on a hybrid attribute set including the default attribute and user's attributes. Then, the decryption could be performed in two sub-phases: D-CSP decrypts ciphertext with the private key component for user's attributes to generate the partially decrypted ciphertext; user completely decrypts the partially decrypted ciphertext with the other private key component for the default attribute. Another trick utilized is building a "matching" property between the two components (for default attribute and for user's attributes) in each private key. Therefore, a curious user cannot forge a valid private key even if colluding with D-CSP. Our technique provides a feasible way to realize the "piecewise key generation" property recently introduced in [41] . Though we describe the application of our technique in KP-ABE, it can be easily extended to CP-ABE as well.
Then, aiming at designing efficient and flexible access control system, we provide several OABE constructions with outsourced key-issuing and decryption.
• Our first construction requires only constant computation (nearly two single-based exponentiations) at attribute authority during key-issuing besides efficient decryption.
• Our second construction provides access control in a fine-grained manner but remains nearly the same efficiency as previous constructions in this paper.
• Our third construction provides a secure solution in a stronger adversary model namely RDoC (refereed delegation of computation) model, only introducing an extra light-weight operation of key combining.
• Our fourth construction further considers dishonest KG-CSPs and D-CSP in the RDoC model, and equips authority and users with the capabilities to check the correctness of outsourcing computation.
Compared with the result in [34] , we have extended it from the following aspects.
First, the formal security definition for OABE supporting both key-issuing outsourcing and decryption outsourcing has been given in this paper. Second, a new OABE construction resistant to partial collusion between KG-CSPs and users has been described in this extension. This new protocol is introduced to improve the security through reducing the trust assumption. Third, we consider a further stronger adversary model, in which the KG-CSPs and D-CSP are not always honest and may return partially computed results for saving resources. For allowing authority and users to verify the correctness of the outsourced key generation and decryption, two techniques, including the checkpoint-based verification and message redundancy, have been used in our forth construction. The number of verifications needed for guaranteeing that the probability of results correctness is beyond a specified threshold is also analyzed. Finally, extensive experiment has been conducted in the Amazon EC2 platform, instead of the simulation with local computer in [34] . The thorough analysis of the new access control system based on OABE and an extensive experimental result have been given.
Organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe some preliminaries. In Section 3, we present the architecture and adversary model for attribute-based access control system. In Section 4, we build block for OABE with outsourced key-issuing and decryption. An efficient access control system based on OABE is described in Section 5. In Section 6, we propose a basic OABE construction with outsourced decryption for access control. Several OABE constructions with outsourced key-issuing and decryption for improved access control are presented in Section 7.
In Section 8, an extensive experimental result is provided for demonstrating the efficiency of our main OABE construction. In Section 9, the previous work related to ours is surveyed. Finally, we draw conclusion in Section 10.
Preliminary
In this section, we firstly define the notations used in this paper and then describe the cryptographic background of ABE.
The notations used in this paper are listed in Table 1. ABE has been widely applied to impose fine-grained access control on encrypted data. There are two kinds of ABE having been proposed: key-policy attribute-based encryption (KP-ABE) and ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE). In KP-ABE, the access policy is assigned in private key, whereas, in CP-ABE, it is specified in ciphertext. Without loss of generality, we are able to denote (I enc , I key ) as the input to encryption and key generation of ABE. Accordingly, in CP-ABE scheme, (I enc , I key ) = (A, ω) while that is (ω, A) in KP-ABE, where ω and A are attribute set and access structure, respectively. Then, an ABE scheme is consisted of four algorithms below.
• Setup(λ) : The setup algorithm takes as input a security parameter λ. It outputs the public key P K and the master key M K.
• KeyGen(I key , M K) : The key extraction algorithm takes as input an access structure (resp. attribute set) I key and the master key M K. It outputs the user's private key SK.
• Encrypt(M, I enc ) : The encryption algorithm takes as input a message M and the attribute set (resp. access structure) I enc . It outputs the ciphertext CT .
• Decrypt(CT, SK) : The decryption algorithm takes as input a ciphertext CT which was assumed to be encrypted under the attribute set (resp. access structure) I enc and the private key SK for access structure (resp. attribute set) I key . It outputs the message M if γ(I key , I enc ) = 1 and the error symbol ⊥ otherwise, where the predicate γ is predefined.
To design ABE primitive, a common technique is to use the bilinear map on elliptic curve. We then introduce the definition of bilinear map as well as its complexity assumption. 
ab for all g 1 , g 2 ∈ G, and a, b ∈ R Z q ;
• Non-degeneracy: There exists In this section, we describe the architecture for the attribute-based access control system and define its security model.
Architecture for the Attribute-based Access Control System
As shown in Fig. 1 , the architecture for the attribute-based access control system consists of the following entities:
• Attribute Authority (AA). This is a key authority for the attribute set. It is responsible for generating public and private parameters for the system. Furthermore, It is in charge of issuing, revoking, and updating attribute keys for users.
• Data Owner. This is a user who owns data files and wishes to outsource them into the external storage server provided by a CSP. It is responsible for defining and enforcing an attribute set (resp. access policy) on its own files by encrypting them under such attribute set (resp. access policy).
• User. This is an entity who wants to access an outsourced file. If the user owns an access structure (resp. attribute set) matching the attributes (policy) embedded in the encrypted file, and is not revoked, he/she will be able to decrypt the ciphertext and obtain the file.
• Storage-Cloud Service Provider (S-CSP). This is an entity that provides a data outsourcing service. It is in charge of controlling the accesses from outside users to the storing data in storage servers and providing corresponding contents services. In this paper, we assume that S-CSP is always online and has abundant storage capacity and computation power.
• Key Generation-Cloud Service Provider (KG-CSP). This is an entity that provides a computing service. It helps AA manage users (including data owner and users) through undertaking the expensive tasks delegated by AA during key-issuing, revoking and updating.
• Decryption-Cloud Service Provider (D-CSP). This is an entity that provides a computing service as well. It helps user efficiently access the outsourced files through performing partial decryption on ciphertext.
We give an overview of the attribute-based access control system as follows.
• System Setup. Public parameter and master key are initialized for the system and AA keeps the master key as secret information.
• New User Grant. When a new user wants to join the system, with the aid of KG-CSP, AA issues an attribute private key to him/her based on his/her attributes .
• New File Creation. When a data owner wants to outsource and share a file with some users, he/she encrypts the file to be uploaded under a specified attribute set (resp. access policy).
• File Access. When a user wants to access an outsourced file, he/she downloads ciphertext from S-CSP and decrypts it with the help of D-CSP.
• User Revocation. When there is a user to be revoked, AA updates "affected" users' private keys with the help of KG-CSP, while the "affected" ciphertexts having been stored on S-CSP will be updated as well.
Adversary Model and Security Requirements
We assume that S-CSP, D-CSP and KG-CSP are honest-but-curious. More precisely, they will follow our proposed protocols, but try to find out as much secret information as possible based on their possessions. Furthermore, D-CSP is allowed to collude with curious users and S-CSP. Thus, two types of adversaries are considered in our access control system: 1) users colluding with D-CSP and S-CSP; 2) semi-trusted KG-CSP, which is not allowed to collude with users.
The security requirement considered in this paper is semantic security of data, which is defined as follows: unauthorized entities (that is, the two types of adversaries defined above) without appropriate access structure (resp. attributes) matching the attributes (resp. policy) embedded in ciphertext should be prevented from accessing the underlying plaintext.
Building Block: OABE
In this section, we firstly provide the definition for OABE (outsourced ABE) with outsourced keyissuing and decryption. Then, its security definitions are presented.
Definition
Based on the system model provided in Section 3, we attempt to define an underlying primitive namely OABE with outsourced key-issuing and decryption for realizing our access control system.
Notice that the definitions of Setup and Encrypt in OABE are identical to traditional ABE shown in Section 2, we only show the definitions of outsourced key-issuing protocol and outsourced decryption protocol.
Outsourced Key-Issuing Protocol. Three entities including users, AA and KG-CSP are involved in this protocol. Upon receiving a key-issuing request from a user, AA firstly sends an outsourcing key (denoted as OK) to KG-CSP and receives a private key component (denoted as SK 1 ) for the user.
The other component SK 2 is computed locally by AA. At a high level, the protocol is described as follows.
The outsourced key-issuing protocol consists of the following three polynomial-time algorithms.
• O-KeyGen-PreProc(I key , M K) : The preprocessing algorithm run by AA takes as input -the access structure (resp. attribute set) I key for a user, the master key M K. It outputs the key pair (OK, AK) where OK denotes the outsourcing key for KG-CSP and AK denotes the secret key for AA to compute the other component of private key.
• O-KeyGen-Outsource(I key , OK) : The outsourced algorithm run by KG-CSP takes as inputthe access structure (resp. attribute set) I key and the outsourcing key OK. It outputs the private key component SK 1 .
• O-KeyGen-PostProc(AK, computed by the user with SK. At a high level, it can be described as follows.
The outsourced decryption protocol consists of the following two polynomial-time algorithms.
• O-Decrypt-Outsource(CT, SK 1 ) : The outsourced algorithm run by D-CSP takes as input -a ciphertext CT assumed to be encrypted under the attribute set (resp. access structure) I enc and the private key component SK 1 for access structure (resp. attribute set) I key . It outputs the partially decrypted ciphertext CT ′ if γ(I key , I enc ) = 1, otherwise outputs ⊥.
• O-Decrypt-Dec(CT ′ , SK) : The complete decryption algorithm run by the user takes as input -the partially decrypted ciphertext CT ′ and the private key SK. It outputs a message M .
Security Definition
Based on the two types of adversaries classfied in Section 3.2, we provide a more precise consideration in OABE:
• Type-I Adversary. It is defined as a curious user colluding with D-CSP. Such an adversary is allowed to ask for all the SK 1 and the private keys SK of dishonest users. The goal of this adversary is to obtain useful information from ciphertext not intended for him/her. Notice that Type-I adversary cannot get outsourcing key OK for any user.
• Type-II Adversary. It is defined as a curious KG-CSP. Such an adversary owns outsourcing keys OK for all users in the system and tries to extract any useful information from ciphertext.
Having the intuition above, we are able to follow the replayable CCA (RCCA) security given in [9] [25] and define RCCA security for both type-I and type-II adversaries in our OABE. Since the security definition is similar to the previous work [25] , we just elaborate them in detail in Appendix A. 
OABE-based Access Control System
In this section, we provide a generic construction of the attribute-based access control system. Its security analysis is presented as well.
Generic Construction
System Setup. Choose a security parameter 1 λ and run the algorithm Setup(1 λ ) of OABE to obtain the public parameter P K and the master key M K. The public parameter is then published, while the master key is kept by AA as a secret.
New File Creation. Whenever a data owner wants to create and upload a file F to S-CSP, he/she firstly defines an attribute set (resp. access structure) I enc for this file. Then, the owner randomly picks a symmetric key K from the key space and encrypts the file F with K using standard symmetric key algorithm such as AES to obtain the ciphertext CT F . Later on, he/she runs the algorithm Encrypt(I enc , K) of OABE to generate the ciphertext CT K which is an encryption of the symmetric key with respect to I enc . Finally, the data owner uploads the ciphertext (CT F , CT K ) to S-CSP.
New User Grant. Assuming a user wants to join the system, he/she needs to be issued a private key on his/her access structure (resp. attribute set) I key from AA who then runs the outsourced keyissuing protocol. In concrete, AA outsources the operation of key-issuing by running the algorithm 2 ) for all the "affected" users by running the outsourced key-issuing protocol with KG-CSP. Additionally, to update "affected" ciphertexts having been stored in S-CSP, a reencrypting key is generated by AA to be sent to S-CSP. S-CSP uses such a key to update the "affected" ciphertexts with the latest version of P K. Notice that the main computation at AA side is updating private keys for "affected" users. Utilizing the outsourced key-issuing protocol, such complexity is minimized.
Security Analysis

Theorem 1 The generic construction of access control system is semantically-secure if the underlying hybrid encryption satisfies RCCA security.
Proof. Please refer to Appendix B.
Therefore, the security of the attribute-based access control system is reduced to that of underlying OABE. In another word, if OABE is secure against both type-I and type-II adversaries, the proposed system is secure. In the following sections, we take our focus on OABE and attempt to provide secure OABE construction for attribute-based access control system.
Basic OABE Construction with Outsourced Decryption
In this section, we will define the access structure used in this paper and propose a basic OABE construction with only outsourced decryption. The security analysis of the proposed construction is provided as well.
Access Structure
is monotone if ∀B, C : if B ∈ A and B ⊆ C then C ∈ A. An access structure (resp. monotone access structure) is a collection (resp. monotone collection) A of non-empty subsets of {P 1 , . . . , P n }.
The sets in A are called authorized sets.
Furthermore, we could define the predicate γ(·, ·) as follows
In this paper, the role of the party is taken by attributes. Thus, the access structure A contains the authorized sets of attributes. Specifically, the access structure represented by tree can be supported in this paper.
Let T be an access tree, in which each interior node is a threshold gate (i.e. AND gate or OR gate) while the leaves are associated with attributes. A user is able to decrypt a ciphertext with a given key if and only if there is an assignment of attributes from the private key to leaf nodes of the tree such that the tree is satisfied.
To facilitate working with the access tree, we define a few notations and functions as follows.
• num x is the number of children of an interior node x. In order to uniquely identify each child, an ordering in the children of every node is defined, that is, the children of node x is numbered from 1 to num x . Therefore, if assuming y is the child of node x, we could denote index(y) as such number associated with the node y.
• k x is the threshold value of an interior node x, specifically, when k x = 1, the threshold gate at x is OR gate and when k x = num x , that is an AND gate. We note that if x is a leaf node it is described by an attribute and a threshold value k x = 1.
• The function parent(x) returns the parent of the node x in the tree. attr(x) returns the attribute associated with the leaf node x.
Proposed Construction
We only consider to outsource the decryption computation of ABE and propose a basic OABE construction with outsourced decryption. In another word, the KG-CSP will not be involved.
For simplicity, this basic construction only considers to support for access structure described as
where U is the attribute universe, ω and ω * are attribute sets and d is a predefined threshold value. Actually, it can be easily extended to an OABE supporting access structure represented by tree as shown in Section 7.2.
Before providing the construction, we define the Lagrange coefficient ∆ i,S for i ∈ Z p and a set S of elements in Z p as
• Setup(λ) : Define a bilinear group G of prime order p with a generator g and a bilinear map
Next, define the attributes in universe U as elements in Z p . For simplicity let n = |U| and the first n elements in Z p (i.e. 1, 2, . . . , n mod p) can be taken to be the universe. Select x ∈ R Z p and set
. . , h n ) and the master key M K = x which is kept secret by AA.
Key-Issuing Phase. As shown in Fig. 2 , a hybrid policy P = P θ ∧P ω is utilized in the key-issuing phase, where ∧ is an AND gate connecting two sub-policies P ω and P θ . More precisely, a default attribute θ is appended with each user's attribute set and the master key x is randomly split into x 1 and x 2 for each user to generate private key components on P ω and P θ respectively.
The key generation algorithm is described as follows.
• KeyGen(ω, M K) : Upon receiving a private key request on attribute set ω, the authority selects 
Encryption Phase. Based on the logical split of user's attribute private key, the default attribute θ should be embeded in each ciphertext to make the decryption successful. The encryption algorithm works as follows.
• Encrypt(M, ω ′ ) : To encrypt a message M with respect to an attribute set ω
Outsourced Decryption Phase. The outsourced decryption is consisted of two algorithms which are provided as follows.
• O-Decrypt-Outsource(CT, SK 1 ) : Suppose that a ciphertext CT is encrypted with an attribute set ω ′ . After receiving the private key component SK 1 for attribute set ω sent from a user, D-CSP computes the partially decrypted ciphertext CT ′ with SK 1 as shown in Fig. 3 , where
• O-Decrypt-Dec(CT ′ , SK) : Upon receiving CT ′ from D-CSP, the user completely decrypts the ciphertext and gets a message M as shown in Fig. 3 .
Remark. Though D-CSP works as a "worker" in the outsourced decryption protocol described above, it enables another scenario in which D-CSP works as a "proxy". More precisely, user can deliver and store SK 1 on D-CSP. In this way, D-CSP can automatically retrieve ciphertexts that the user is interested in and forward to him/her partially decrypted ones. For example, D-CSP could be users' mail server, or the cloud storage server and D-CSP could be the same entity.
Security Analysis
The main challenge in our construction is to prevent against attacks from the collusion between users and D-CSP. However, such collusion is resistant due to the random split on master key x for each user. More precisely, if two different users call for their private keys, AA will choose two random splits (x 1 , x 2 ) and (x Since basic outsoured decryption is supported, we only need to consider the security against type-I adversary. Then, we have the following security result.
Theorem 2 The basic OABE scheme with outsourced decryption is secure against chosen-plaintext attack in selective model under DBDH assumption.
Proof. Please refer to Appendix C.
System
In this section, based on the basic OABE, we further propose three OABE constructions supporting outsourced key-issing. Utilizing these primitives, we can build an access control system with efficient key management.
OABE Construction for Efficient Access Control
Notice that in our basic construction, any adversary possessing either SK 1 or SK 2 cannot extract any useful information from the ciphertext. Thus, we are able to outsource the operation of generating SK 1 to KG-CSP but remain computing SK 2 at AA. Considering on this, we propose an OABE construction with outsourced key-issuing and decryption. Since the other phases are identical to our basic construction, we only provide the outsourced key-issuing protocol as follows.
• O-KeyGen-PreProc(ω, M K) : The preprocessing algorithm in outsourced key-issuing protocol is run by AA. It picks x 1 ∈ R Z p and sets We have shown that the proposed construction is resistant to the type-I adversary in Section 6.3. Therefore, it is only needed to prove its security under the attack launched by the type-II adversary. Intuitively, in order to decrypt ciphertext, the adversary has to recover e (g 1 , g 2 ) s . The adversary could utilize Lagrange interpolation on SK 1 and C 1 = g s from ciphertext to recover the desired value. This will result in e(g, g 2 ) sx1 but blinded by e(g, g 2 ) sx2 which cannot be removed unless the other component of private key SK 2 is used.
Thus, we can get the following security result based on the analysis above.
Theorem 3 The proposed OABE construction with outsourced key-issuing and decryption is secure against chosen-plaintext attack launched by type-II adversary.
Combining Theorem 2 and Theorem 3 together, the proposed construction is secure against the chosen-plaintext attack.
OABE Construction for Fine-Grained Access Control
Though we describe our outsourcing key-issuing technique in the threshold ABE, it can be easily extended to be applied to the access tree-based KP-ABE scheme [24] to enable fine-grained access control.
The idea behind this extension is to build a hybrid tree T as shown in Fig. 4 , where ∧ and ∨ denote AND and OR gates respectively, and A i denotes the attribute. In this case, KG-CSP is to compute SK 1 with the tree-based access policy instead of threshold policy.
Suppose the access tree specified by user is denoted as T U . Assuming the parameters have been assigned as the setup algorithm in Section 6.2, we provide the outsourced key-issuing protocol for access tree-based KP-ABE scheme as follows.
• O-KeyGen-PreProc(T U , M K) : Randomly pick a one-degree polynomial q R (·) with q R (0) = x.
Set x 1 = q R (1) and x 2 = q R (2). Finally output OK = x 1 and AK = x 2 .
• O-KeyGen-Outsource(T U , OK) : Firstly, choose a (k y − 1)-degree polynomial q y (·) for each node y (including leaves) in the tree T U in a top-down manner. We note that the polynomial q y (·) is chosen with the restriction that q y (0) = x 1 if y is the root node in T U , otherwise q y (0) = q parent(y) (index(y)). Let Y U be the set of leaf nodes in T U , then the private key component SK 1 is set to be ({g
• O-KeyGen-PostProc(AK, SK 1 ) : After generating the component SK 2 = ({g
of private key where r θ ∈ R Z p , AA outputs the private key SK = (SK 1 , SK 2 ).
OABE Construction Resistant to Partial Collusion
Notice that in the assumption in Section 3.2, KG-CSP is not allowed to collude with users. In this section, we attempt to relax this assumption by allowing partial collusion between KG-CSP and users, and propose an improved OABE construction under a stronger adversary model namely RDoC (refereed delegation of computation) model, in which two KG-CSPs are involved and either of them is allowed to collude with users. Actually, this model has been utilized by Hohenberger and Lysyanskaya [26] to securely outsource cryptographic computations and was later formalized in [10] [13].
For simplicity, threshold policy is considered. Since the setup, encryption and outsourced decryption phases operate exactly as before, we only describe the outsourced key-issuing protocol with two KG-CSPs as follows.
• O-KeyGen-PreProc(ω, M K) : The algorithm is presented similar to that in our proposed construction in Section 7.1. The only difference is that AA does not directly send x 1 to KG-CSP, but makes a further random split to obtain x 11 and x 12 with x 1 = x 11 + x 12 mod p. Finally,
• • O-KeyGen-PostProc(SK and SK 1 [2] as shown in Fig. 6 . Finally output SK = (SK 1 , SK 2 ).
OABE Construction with Checkability
It is worthwhile noting that all the constructions having been presented till now are under the assumption that KG-CSP and D-CSP are both "honest-but-curious" in Section 3.2, i.e., they will follow our proposed protocol, but try to extract private information as much as possible. Nevertheless, we point out that, when experiencing commercial cloud computing services, a public cloud service provider may be selfish in order to save its computation or download bandwidth, which is beyond the conventional "honest-but-curious" model. So, in this section, based on the construction in the RDoC model (i.e., the construction in Section 7.3), we attempt to make further improvement by equipping attribute authority and users with checkabilities, such that any dishonest actions of KG-CSP or D-CSP could be detected with probabilities.
The idea under this construction for supporting checkability resides in two sides. For detecting the dishonest actions in outsourced key-issuing, we extend the idea of "ringer" [23] by manually selecting the random factors, which allows to compare the returned keys from both KG-CSPs and report dishonesty if any difference is found. For detecting the dishonest action in outsourced decryption, we follow the trick in [29] by encrypting a random message M ′ as well as a "hash"
on both M and M ′ as redundancy and user is able to decrypt both ciphertexts and verify the correctness with the redundant "hash". We give the detail of our construction with two KG-CSPs in RDoC model as follows.
• Setup(λ) : It is similar to the same algorithm in Section 6.2, but a random group element v ∈ R G and a hash function H : G T → Z p should be agreed in public key for generating redundancy. Finally, the public key P K = (H(·), v, g, g 1 , g 2 , h, h 1 , . . . , h n ) is published and the master key M K = x is kept secret.
• O-KeyGen-PreProc(ω, M K) : Upon receiving a private key request on ω, as shown in Fig. 7 as a "ringer", and for each attribute i ∈ ω, pick randomness 
in the same order of receiving (R j , F).
• O-KeyGen-PostProc(SK 
where r θ ∈ R Z p . Then, AA continues to check the correctness of outsourced key-issuing
′ for all i ∈ ω. If the equations above hold, AA continues to compute [2] and [2] . Finally return SK = (SK 1 , SK 2 ) where
• Encrypt(M, ω ′ ) : As with the previous constructions, user encrypts M by selecting s ∈ R Z p and computing
Further, user continues to pick a random message M ′ ∈ R G T and encrypts it in the same way
v, user outputs the ciphertext
• O-Decrypt-Outsource(CT, SK 1 ) : It is similar to the same algorithm in previous construction.
The only difference is that the D-CSP makes partial decryption on the ciphertexts of both
is returned.
• O-Decrypt-Dec(CT ′ , SK) : It is identical to the same algorithm in previous construction except that the dishonest action of D-CSP should be detected through checking redundancy.
Specifically, by executing the decryption algorithm in previous construction, M and M ′ are obtained. The user continues to check whether the redundancy Rdd = g
It is worthwhile noting, our construction guarantees, that any dishonest action from D-CSP could be detected by user, while the dishonest action from either KG-CSP could be detected by AA with probability (d − 1 + |ω|)/2|ω|.
We also notice that, in practical application the outsourced key-issuing and decryption do not need to be checked at each time. To be more clear, suppose the key-issuing and decryption are outsourced for several times, and D-CSP and KG-CSP respectively cheats for probability p 1 and p 2 in each time.
Denote A k,n as the probability of catching cheating with n outsourcings, of which only the k are verified. For the outsourced decryption case, we have A k,n = (1 − p 1 ) k−1 p 1 . This is because, 1) user can perfectly verify the correctness of outsourced decrypted results in verification; 2) the last outsourcing (i.e., the nth outsourcing) should be D-CSP's cheating, caught by user; 3) the first k − 1 outsourcings (having been verified) should be honest to avoid being caught in verification. It is clear that the probability A k,n is independent of n. Then, we can further compute the probability of catching cheating with at most k times for verification is
is clear that, if we want to let the cheating be caught not less than a threshold probability T 1 , the client should verify at least log 1−p1 (1 − T 1 ) times.
For the outsourced key-issuing case, without loss of generality, we denote the probability of catching dishonest action in ith outsourcing as q i , where q i = (d − 1 + |ω i |)/2|ω i | and ω i is the attribute set for private key request in ith outsourcing. Then we have
This is because, 1) AA can only verify the correctness with probability q i in the ith time (if KG-CSP exactly cheats); 2) The first k − 1 outsourcings (having been verified) could not catch the cheating due to two cases: KG-CSP does not cheat or KG-CSP's dishonest action escapes from checking.
Similarly, we can have the probability of catching cheating with at most k times for verification is
If we want to let the cheating be caught not less than a threshold probability T 2 , the user should verify at least log 1−p2/2 T 2 times.
Performance Evaluation
In this section, we will provide an empirical evaluation of the efficient OABE scheme in Section 7.1 but with outsourced decryption as well. Our test bed is built over Amazon EC2 platform.
More precisely, we use a high I/O Quadruple Extra Large (hi1.4xlarge) server as the KG-CSP and D-CSP, and a Linux machine with 2GB memory, and Pentium(R) Dual-Core CPU E5800 clocked at 3.20GHz and 3.19GHz works as our local device.
Before making evaluation, we need to determine the performance difference performed by both hardwares, i.e., the KG-CSP and D-CSP using high I/O Quadruple Extra Large server and the local Linux machine. We build our benchmark test in Table 2 , which compares the time in computing bilinear map, modular exponentiations and 100 modular multiplications. Table 3 shows the efficiency comparison in setup phase. In this evaluation, we respectively fix the threshold d = 8 and d = 16, and vary the number of attributes in the universe from 50 to 100.
From this table, it can be derived that our OABE scheme takes more time (but it is negligible in the case of large universe) than the original one. That is compared with the original ABE scheme, an additional initialization of the default θ is required for facilitating outsourcing.
The efficiency comparison of encryption phase is shown in Fig. 8 , in which we examine the performance in the case of d = 8 and d = 16, while varying the number of attributes from 20 to 60.
By comparing the both subfigures ( Fig. 8(a) and Fig. 8(b) ), it is clear that the encryption efficiency of both OABE and ABE is independent of the threshold value d. Besides, in each individual one, OABE is slightly slower than its original scheme. This is because the newly introduced default attribute θ should be embedded in each cipehrtext to allow for successful decryption in future.
In Fig. 9 (a) , we show the efficiency comparison of KeyGen phase. In this evaluation, we fix the universe size as 100, and randomly pick 20, 40 and 60 attributes to examine the efficiency of (outsourced) key-issuing under cases that the threshold value d = 5 and 16. It is clear that our
proposed OABE has a better performance than the original ABE in overall efficiency. Actually, regarding to the computation complexity, our construction requires more computations compared with the original ABE to preserve the privacy of the master key , but with the idea of outsourcing, the KG-CSP with stronger computing power is able to be involved in the computation intensive task, while leaving the lightweight computation at authority.
To evaluate the efficiency of (outsourced) decryption, as with the previous experiment, we also fix the universe size as 100, but since the actual number of attributes embedded in ciphertext and private key does not affect decryption efficiency, we respectively generate ciphertext and private key embedding 100 attributes, which allows a permanent decryption in our evaluation. Then, the efficiency shown in Fig. 9 (b) is examined under a varying threshold value from 8 to 24. It is not surprising to see that our outsourced decryption has much better performance than the original ABE scheme, and the gap becomes larger as the growth of the threshold value. This is also because a more powerful CSP is involved in outsourced decryption, which has a more significant difference with common device (used in ABE) in dealing with large computation. Besides the overall performance, through outsourcing, the local computation in decryption is also limited to constant, just two bilinear pairings which can be finished in less than 10 ms with our local device.
9 Related Work
Attribute-based Encryption
The notion of ABE, which was introduced as fuzzy identity-based encryption in [42] , was firstly dealt with by Goyal et al. [24] . Two different and complementary notions of ABE were defined as KP-ABE and CP-ABE. A construction of KP-ABE was provided in the same paper [24] , while the first CP-APE construction supporting tree-based access structure in generic group model is presented by Bethencourt et al. [7] .
Subsequently, a number of variants of ABE schemes have been proposed since its introduction.
They range from extending its functionality to proposing schemes with stronger security proofs. 
Cloud Computing
Cloud Computing is the latest term encapsulating the delivery of computing resources as a service [1] . It is the current iteration of utility computing and returns to the model of "renting" resources.
Leveraging cloud computing is today, the defacto means of deploying internet scale systems and much of the internet is tethered to a large number of cloud service providers.
In fashion. We specify that in this work we also aim to utilize outsourcing computation technique to deliver overhead computation to KG-CSP and D-CSP.
Outsourcing Computation
Actually, the problem that how to securely outsource different kinds of expensive computations has drew much attention from theoretical computer science community [4] [20] has shown that even for weak security parameters on "bootstrapping" operation of the homomorphic encryption, it would take at least 30 seconds on a high performance machine. Therefore, even if the privacy of the input and output can be preserved by utilizing these general techniques, the computational overhead is still huge and impractical.
A number of works have been proposed to tackle practical problems in the cloud aided model, which explores a joint point between cloud computing and outsourcing computation. Wang et al.
[43] presented efficient mechanisms for secure outsourcing of linear programming computation. Li et al. [36] proposed an outsourcing technique for aided revocation in identity-based encryption.
Recently, a novel paradigm for ABE was provided [25] key by running a number of exponentiations. But such key blinded operation is eliminated in our construction in Section 6.2 through introducing a default attribute (actually, our technique provides a feasible way to realize the "piecewise key generation" property recently introduced in [41] ).
Recently Lai et al. [29] proposed a concrete construction for ABE with verifiable decryption, which achieves verifiability without random oracles. Their work appends a redundancy with ciphertext and uses this redundancy for correctness checking. However, all of the previous work (except [35] ) lacks of the consideration on the reducing overhead computation at attribute authority. In this paper we also consider a type of collusion attack in the sense that KG-CSP is dishonest and its defense strategy.
Conclusion
In this paper, we propose an efficient attribute-based access control system in cloud computing.
In our system, two CSPs namely KG-CSP and D-CSP are introduced as employees to finish the outsourced heavy tasks for user management and file access respectively. The overhead at both users and attribute authority sides is thus being minimized. A challenging issue in the proposed system is how to outsource the computational task to CSPs without any private information leakage. To deal with this issue, we formalize an underlying primitive namely OABE and provide several OABE constructions with outsourced key-issuing and decryption. Finally, through extensive experiments, it demonstrates that our OABE construction achieves efficient key-issuing and decryption at AA and user sides respectively.
• O SK1 (I key 
RCCA Security Game for Type-II Adversary
Setup. It is identical to the setup phase in the RCCA security game for type-I adversary.
Phase 1.
Challenger initializes an empty table T to provide adversary the oracles below.
• O OK (I key into T .
• O M (I key , CT ). It is identical to O M (I key , CT ) in the RCCA security game for type-I adversary except that the entry to be added is in the form of (I key , SK, OK). will be replaced by a special message.
Guess. Adversary outputs a guess b
Denote A i as type-i adversary for i = I, II. Then, their advantages in attacking the OABE scheme E is measured by the probability Adv
Appendix B: Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. The security will be analyzed based on the security model of access control system given in Section 3.2. More specifically, two types of adversaries will be considered here, that is, type-I and type-II adversaries. For each type adversary, we show how to construct a simulator to break the hybrid encryption at a high level.
Notice that in the generic construction, a hybrid encryption has been utilized to encrypt the file. Since the file is encrypted with a hybrid encryption as (CT F , CT K ), to get any information about F, the adversary should decrypt CT K to retrieve the symmetric key K. However such a key is protected by OABE. As we know, the above hybrid encryption scheme could achieve RCCA security if the following two conditions are satisfied [17] , that is, 1) the OABE scheme is RCCA secure and 2) the symmetric key encryption scheme is CCA secure. Thus, data confidentiality can be reduced to the confidentiality security of the underlying OABE and symmetric key encryption [17] . Moreover, the privacy of OABE ciphertext on S-CSP against outside users without I key can be trivially guaranteed because its security definition inherits that in traditional ABE. Another attack on data confidentiality is launched by KG-CSP. Such an attack is modeled as type-II adversary by introducing an oracle O OK (·) in the corresponding security game of OABE. Specifically, we allow such an adversary to ask for outsourcing keys OK for all the users, but it is not allowed to get any private keys of users. Curious users can collude with both D-CSP and S-CSP to launch attack, which is modeled as type-I adversary in the definition of OABE. Thus, the security of the attributebased access control system is reduced to that of underlying OABE and symmetric encryption.
Appendix C: Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. Assume there exists an adversary A breaks the proposed scheme, we can build a simulator S that uses A as a sub-algorithm to solve the DBDH problem as follows. for x, y, z, v ∈ R Z p . S is asked to output a value µ ′ as the guess for µ. We provide the simulation as follows.
Init. The simulator S runs A and receives a challenge attribute set ω * from A.
Setup. S assigns the public parameter as follows. = di0 [2] 0 , di1 [1] 0 ?
where SK1 = {(di0, di1)}i2!, SK2 = (d✓0, d✓1);
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